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Branding Islam: Islam, Law, and  
Bureaucracies in Southeast Asia 
Kerstin Steiner 
Abstract: Islam plays a pivotal political role in Southeast Asian countries, 
where the governments that have ruled since independence have been 
concerned with influencing the trajectory, content, hermeneutic and style 
of the legal traditions of their Muslim citizens and reconciling them with 
the states’ wider policy objectives. This contribution looks at one par-
ticular tool for this form of ‘guiding’ Islam – the codification of Islam – 
comparing the codes in two Muslim-majority countries (Malaysia and 
Brunei) and two Muslim-minority countries (Singapore and the Philip-
pines). Utilising comparative law methodologies, this article explores the 
structure, style and content of the codes in order to explicate their ex-
plicit and implied function. These codes are less concerned with being a 
statement of substantive Islamic law than with setting up a state-sanc-
tioned bureaucracy for the administration of law for Muslims. These 
bureaucratic institutions were the key instruments for the states to devel-
op their own brand of Islam. In doing so, the state’s approach towards 
socially engineering Islam oscillates among appropriation, accommoda-
tion, control and subjugation of Islam in different political and legal 
frameworks.  
  Manuscript received 12 February 2018; accepted 12 April 2018 
Keywords: Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Islam, Codes for 
Muslims 
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1 Introduction 
A common characteristic of Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philip-
pines is that, upon obtaining independence, they had to negotiate their 
own approach to accommodating and controlling Islam in their respec-
tive legal and political frameworks.  
The working hypothesis for this article1 is that the states sought to 
achieve this by utilising bureaucratic institutions, which resulted in the 
development of a special brand of Islam. The numerous possible defini-
tions of bureaucracy are mostly based on discipline-specific perspectives 
or used for specific purposes, some of which are explored in this special 
issue. For the purposes of this article, bureaucratisation focuses on a very 
specific legal conceptualisation of bureaucracy; that is, the state-sanc-
tioned framework and institutions that are required in order to adminis-
ter Islam.  
This article focuses on one of the instruments used to achieve this, 
namely the different codes for the administration of law for Muslims. 
While these countries have arguably borrowed from each other’s codes, I 
have deliberately not covered the issues of legal transplant, legal transfer 
or legal harmonisation as such,2 focusing instead on a micro-comparison 
of those codes. I take, from a comparative legal methodological perspec-
tive, what has been described as an arguably pragmatic “methodological 
mishmash” (Michaels 2006: 362), looking at factors such as structure, 
                                                 
1  This article draws in part on research for the two monographs on Islam, Law 
and the State in Southeast Asia, Volume II, Singapore and Volume III Malaysia 
and Brunei co-authored by Lindsey and Steiner (2012a and 2012b). 
 I would like to thank Professor Tim Lindsey and Professor M B Hooker for 
the use of some material from our joint current research project on Islam, Law 
and the State in the Philippines, funded by an ARC Discovery Project. 
 Parts of this paper were presented at the 2017 EuroSEAS Conference as part 
of the panel on ‘Bureaucratizing the Sharia: Socio-Legal Dimensions of Islamic 
Governance in Southeast Asia’, Oxford University, 16–18 August 2017 and as a 
keynote at the 2nd PHISO Conference on ‘Re-Thinking the Regions in Global 
International Relations’, Ateneo de Davao University, Philippines, 23–24 
March 2018. I would like to thank participants for their valuable comments. 
 I am also grateful to Dominik M. Müller and the anonymous reviews from 
JCSAA for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. The views in this article 
are the author’s and are not meant to represent any other individual or institu-
tion. 
2  There is an extensive literature on this matter; see, for instance, the contribu-
tions in the edited volumes by Hoecke (2004); Legrand and Munday (2003); 
Nelken and Feest (2001). For a compilation on comparative legal studies in 
Asia; see, for example, Biddulph and Nicholson (2008). 
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terminology and general content in order to investigate the bureaucratic 
framework for Islam. 
The codes lay the foundation for state control over Islam and de-
fine the content of Islam through institutions of administration and 
enforcement. In exploring these points of convergence and divergence 
of this state bureaucracy, I will explore three key themes: (1) what is regu-
lated in these codes (subdivided into the topics of the scope and sources of Islam-
ic law and the bureaucratic and judicial institutions required to administer and 
enforce it); (2) which enables an elucidation of the explicit and implied 
functions of these codes; and finally (3) an evaluation of how that function is 
fulfilled.  
The remainder of this article is divided into two parts. The first part 
will provide an overview of the context of Islam in Southeast Asia while 
the second part will address the above-mentioned themes, thus exploring 
the different forms of state bureaucratisation. 
2 The Context of Islam, Law and the State 
in Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and the 
Philippines 
The Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei share a plural legal sys-
tem in which Islamic law and ‘civil’3 law coexist, to varying degrees. This 
coexistence of different normative systems is a result of the histories of 
these countries, where local laws, Islamic law and colonial laws have 
intermingled.  
Islam reached the Malay Peninsula by the 14th century and spread 
with the territorial expansion of the Malacca Sultanate during the 15th 
century (Tregonning 1972: 16–21). Islam became deeply imbedded into 
the political landscape of Southeast Asia. In pre-colonial Malaysia, the 
sultans of their respective states were the political leaders but also the 
heads of religion. In this sense, there was no separation between politics, 
Islam and law.4 This changed during the British colonial period, when 
the status of Islam in the British colonial territories varied.  
The Straits Settlement, 5  which included Singapore, was a crown 
colony whose sovereignty rested with the British. Therefore, Islam was 
                                                 
3  I use the adjective ‘civil’ in order to refer to secular law and/or the non-
religious laws in those four countries. 
4  For an account of this relationship, see, for instance, Milner (1985). 
5  The Straits Settlement consisted of Malacca, Penang, and Singapore as well as 
Labuan (from 1907). It was established in 1826 by the British East India Com-
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not the official religion (see Means 1969: 275) and the authority of Islam 
depended on the Charter of Justice, statute and precedent and the ac-
commodation it made for Islam. Thus, unlike in its neighbouring Malay 
states, Islamic law was never the law of the land. Singapore’s road to 
independence is, arguably, influenced partly by the ruling elite’s attitude 
toward Islam. In 1959, the island became self-governing and held official 
elections. The People’s Action Party (PAP) won these elections – and 
has won every subsequent election until the time of writing. In 1963, 
Singapore merged with the Federation of Malaya, only to leave 23 
months later and become an independent nation. Leaving the Federation 
of Malaya was a result of persistent disagreement between the Chinese-
dominated PAP and Malaya’s ruling Malay-dominated Alliance. This dis-
agreement was partially caused by religious concerns, in particular the 
role that Islam was to play within the state. Islam was supposed to be the 
official religion of the Federation of Malaya, as it still is today in Malaysia. 
This approach did not sit well within non-Muslim majority Singapore. In 
addition, communal tension between the majority non-Muslim popula-
tion and the Muslim minority in Singapore rose during the 1950s and 60s 
(Lindsey and Steiner 2012b: 239–244). Therefore, it is no surprise that 
the Republic of Singapore maintained a model for the administration of 
law for Muslims built largely upon the colonial experience. This meant 
that Islam was to be accommodated into a secular system,6 restricting 
religion to the personal sphere and, consequently, limiting Islamic law to 
private matters. It also meant subjugating Islam to the interests of the 
ruling party (Steiner 2015b).  
The legal framework for regulating religion in Singapore can be 
found in several pieces of legislation, the most important being the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), (cap 167A, No 26 of 
1990, rev ed 2001) a statute based around a notion of ‘religious harmony’ 
defined in terms of state security; the Internal Security Act (ISA) (cap 
143, No 18 of 1960, rev ed 1985); and the Sedition Act (cap 290, No 14 
of 1948, rev ed 2013) (Steiner 2011a). 
At the core of the legal infrastructure for control of Islam, and thus 
Muslims in Singapore, is the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) 
(cap 3, No 27 of 1966, rev ed 2009) (hereafter called AMLA (Singapore), 
which sets out the various institutions responsible for shaping the state-
                                                                                                    
pany and became a crown colony in 1867. The territories are now part of the 
modern nations of Singapore and Malaysia. 
6  For details on the Singaporean approach towards secularism and the Muslim 
minority, see Steiner (2011a). 
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sanctioned interpretation of Islamic law. Introduced in 1966, AMLA 
provides the overall legal framework for Islamic law in Singapore.  
During colonial times in the Federated Malay States, the Unfederat-
ed Malay States and Brunei, Islam was present via the treaties and the 
sovereignty of the Sultan.7 The difference was that, with the colonial 
administration, these sultans lost – to various degrees depending on the 
colonial status of their respective territories – their political power but 
retained their religious power. Thus, Islam is part of the political, ideo-
logical and constitutional framework in Malaysia and Brunei (Lindsey 
and Steiner 2012a).  
In 1957, the Federation of Malaya became independent of British 
colonial rule and, in 1963, Singapore (initially), British North Borneo and 
Sarawak joined in order to form Malaysia. Malaysia’s Federal Constitu-
tion was promulgated on 31 August 1957, creating a federal parliamen-
tary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. Islam is a prominent 
feature of the Federal Constitution, with article 3(1) providing that Islam 
is the religion of the federation and article 3(2) stating that the ruler of 
each state is the head of the religion. The result of this constitutional 
framework is a politically and socially hotly contested debate: whether 
Malaysia is an Islamic state or not.8 Moreover, two of the main political 
parties – UMNO (United Malays National Organisation, Pertubuhan 
Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu) and PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, Pan-
                                                 
7  Means (1969: 274), quoting the first agreement, the Pangkor Engagement, 
which stated that the Ruler ‘receive and provide a suitable residence for a Brit-
ish Officer […] whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all questions 
other than those touching Malay Religion and Custom.’ 
8  Globally there is no theoretical consensus about what constitutes an Islamic 
state; for an overview of the different possibilities of defining Islamic state in 
the context of Malaysia, see Harding (2002). Tunku Abdul Rahman, who later 
became Malaysia’s first Prime Minister, commented that “this country is not an 
Islamic state as it is generally understood […] Islam shall be the official religion 
of the state” and that “unless we are prepared to drown every non-Malay, we 
can never think of an Islamic Administration” (Ahmad Ibrahim 1985: 213) and 
(von der Mehden 1963: 73). In 2011, the Prime Minister at that time, Dr Ma-
hathir Mohamad, declared that Malaysia should be regarded as an Islamic state. 
In 2007, this sentiment was partially re-asserted by Deputy Prime Minister 
Najib Razak who declared that Malaysia was never a secular state (Bernama 
2007). For an overview of the current status of the debate, albeit in German, 
see Steiner (2017). 
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Malaysian Islamic Party) – regularly try to out-Islamicise each other 
(Noor 2004; Lindsey and Steiner 2012a: 13–16).9  
The bureaucratisation of Islam continued in post-independence Ma-
laysia, a development that was unprecedented before British arrival. 
Adding to the complexity of this discourse is the federal structure of 
independent Malaysia. State governments were granted legislative pre-
rogative over Islamic matters, as prescribed by the Ninth Schedule, List 
II of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. The states in Malaysia have 
now passed multiple pieces of Islamic legislation, dealing with the limited 
matters of substantive law (particularly family law and criminal offences) 
and procedural law (particularly Syariah court evidence, criminal proce-
dure and civil procedure). These enactments are not necessarily uniform 
but do share common elements.10 Thus, for the purpose of this article, 
the regulatory framework of the Federal Territories will be used, the 
main one being the Administration of Islamic Law Act (Federal Territo-
ries), No 505 of 1993.11  
Brunei is one of the few absolute monarchies in the world, with the 
current Sultan, Hj Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah, holding the 
positions of King, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of  
Finance and, more recently, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He is 
also the official “guardian and protector” of Islam and tradition in Bru-
nei. According to article 3(2) and (3) of Brunei’s Constitution, the Sultan 
is Head of the Religion and is advised by the Islamic Religious Council. 
In consultation with the Sultan, the Religious Council is the highest reli-
gious authority in Brunei. As such Islam, politics and law are even more 
intertwined than in neighbouring Malaysia. In Brunei, Islam is part of the 
Brunei Malay Muslim Monarchy (Melayu Islam Beraja or MIB). As Lindsey 
and Steiner (2012a: 345) commented, “MIB conflates sovereignty and 
political legitimacy with the Sultanate, Islam and Malay identity” and, to a 
certain degree, the underpinning ideas of MIB are a continuum from the 
colonial period, “when pre-colonial notions of authority of the Crown 
were relied upon as a tool of British colonial rule”.  
                                                 
9  Mauzy (1983–1984) used this expression in order to refer to the political com-
petition between UMNO and PAS under the Mahathir administration. It still 
holds true today.  
10  See for example Steiner (2011b) on zakat; Steiner (2013) on unilateral conver-
sion of children; and Lindsey and Steiner (2012a) on apostasy. 
11  Hereafter called the Administration of Islamic Law Act (Federal Territories). 
Some reference is made to other states where deemed necessary to illustrate 
points of divergence. 
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However, the scope of law for Muslims has greatly expanded in 
Brunei since independence, with Islam taking centre stage. As in neigh-
bouring Malaysia, there are numerous acts and orders dealing with the 
administration of laws for Muslims. 12  The main one – the Religious 
Council, State Custom and Kathis Courts Enactment of 1955 – came 
into force four years before Brunei’s Constitution was promulgated and 
the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam became a self-governing state. It is 
reminiscent of the legislation that was passed in Kelantan, one of Malay-
sia’s states. It is far more comprehensive than any previous colonial legis-
lation on the administration of law for Muslims in Brunei (Hooker 1984: 
177). In 1984, a revised version was enacted and the Religious Council 
and Kadis Courts Act, cap 77, of 1984.13 The revised version left much 
of the previous enactment intact, introducing some structural rearrange-
ment of the provisions on substantive matters, the broadening of the 
jurisdiction of the Syariah courts was the main change. In the late 1990s, 
further reforms to the Syariah courts were passed, albeit through Syariah 
Courts Emergency Order of 1998, which was enacted on 31 October 
2000 as the Syariah Courts Act, cap 184, of 2000. 
The Philippines, it shares some commonalities with the previously 
discussed Anglo-Malay countries of Southeast Asia. As in Singapore, 
Muslims are the minority in the Philippines. The Philippines is the largest 
Catholic country in Southeast Asia and has the third-largest Catholic 
population in the world. However, there were long-established and flour-
ishing Muslim kingdoms across the islands, including the powerful Sul-
tanate of Sulu,14 when Spanish conquest – and Christian conversion – 
began in the late 16th century. As in the Anglo-Malay countries, colonial 
policies were established to lay down policies regarding how matters of 
Islam were supposed to be dealt with. The Spanish considered Islam to 
be “a noxious weed” and for three centuries under the Spanish, and then 
under American occupation in the first half of the 20th century, Muslims 
(known as ‘Moros’ or Moors by the Spanish) “suffered systematic ne-
                                                 
12  Technically, Brunei has been in a perpetual state of emergency since 1962 
which is renewed every two years. As such the Sultan is authorised to pass 
“Orders” under his emergency powers in Section 83(3) of the Constitution. 
“Acts” are enacted through processes involving the Legislative Council. The in-
tention is that the emergency orders will be eventually promulgated as acts over 
time. However, Acts are also frequently replaced by orders, making it difficult 
to recognise any trends for institutional changes. 
13  Hereafter called Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei). 
14  This Sultanate covered parts of Mindanao, parts of Palawan and north-eastern 
Borneo thereby crossing the modern nation borders of the Philippines and Ma-
laysia. 
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glect and discrimination in the context of hundreds of years of struggle 
for self-rule” (Stephens 2011: 3–4).  
Economically disadvantaged and politically neglected by compari-
son to other regions in the Philippines, the historical aspirations for 
Moro independence are tied to resentment at their history of repression 
and neglect by governments in the north, and a sense that the southern 
kingdoms were once major powers in the region.  
This combination of minority status, lost glory and poverty has 
proved toxic, with resentment and armed secessionist violence remaining 
strong (Chiarella 2012). Government policies on the Moro have taken 
many different forms, ranging from armed intervention, and failed at-
tempts at integration to peace negotiations and various largely unsatisfac-
tory attempts at political and religious accommodation. They have also 
included mediation by a range of international actors, which led to the 
creation of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a 
special national government body established to represent Muslim inter-
ests, and the 1977 Code of Muslim Personal Laws (CMPL),15 a revision 
of an earlier, unsuccessful attempt in 1974 to pass an Administration of 
Muslim Law Code based on similar statutes in Singapore and Malaysia. 
The next part of this article will look at these codes in more detail, 
for a micro-comparison of their structure, content and function. 
3 The Southeast Asian Codes for Muslims 
Hooker (n.d.: 3) wrote that these “codes in Southeast Asia have more in 
common than not. Judges from one state would find themselves pretty 
well at home with the Codes of one or more of the others.” Indeed, the 
four codes share several common elements, including structure and ter-
minology. In addition, these codes all have a similar purpose, which is to 
establish a framework providing for the accommodation of Islam in the 
respective plural legal systems. However, there are also certain significant 
differences, particularly regarding how this purpose is achieved. The 
result is slightly different approaches towards the bureaucratisation of 
Islam. 
3.1 At First Glance: The Structure of the Codes  
At first glance, the three codes of Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei share a 
more or less common structure, starting with a preliminary part defining 
                                                 
15  Hereafter called 1977 CMPL (Philippines). 
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the purpose and providing general definitions. This is followed by sever-
al parts that establish the main administrative bureaucratic institutions – 
a council and courts, both required to administer and adjudicate on mat-
ters of Islam – and the rules governing the activities of these institutions.  
In the case of Singapore, this is followed by various parts containing 
a narrow range of substantive rules for Islamic law that are given legal 
force. These rules pertain to personal laws for Muslim-governing matters, 
such as procedures for betrothal, marriage, divorce, property and offenc-
es if the procedures set out in AMLA (Singapore) are not followed. In 
short, one could describe AMLA (Singapore) as a ‘one-stop shop’ for law 
for Muslims in Singapore. Given the political and social context in Sin-
gapore, it is not surprising that this more streamlined approach was cho-
sen. Malaysia and Brunei have fewer of those ‘substantive’ rules, mainly 
because they are covered in additional codes.16  
The 1977 CMPL in the Philippines diverts partially from this struc-
tural formula. The code is divided into five books, starting with ‘General 
Provisions’, which defines terms and sources of law, followed by several 
books that provide for a narrow range of substantive rules for Islamic 
law in the Philippines that is reminiscent of the Singaporean approach.  
The state bureaucratic framework, which featured heavily at the be-
ginning of the codes for Muslims in Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, is 
covered in Book Four ‘Adjudication and Settlement of Legal Disputes 
and Rendition of Legal Opinions’. This book is relatively short com-
pared to the other codes, as only 31 articles are required to lay the foun-
dation for a very limited number of administrative institutions; namely, 
the Syariah courts and the jurisconsult or mufti. It is striking that, unlike 
the other Southeast Asian codes, the 1977 CMPL did not establish a 
religious council, which will be discussed in detail below.  
These structural differences are interesting to note because the Phil-
ippines had a draft that was much more similar to the codes in Singapore, 
Malaysia and Brunei in the sense that it emphasised the bureaucratic 
structure required to administer Muslim personal law. The short-lived 
1974 Codification Research Staff Report had a very different focus. The 
Research Staff, led by Datu Michael Mastura and Musib M Buat, was 
                                                 
16  In the Federal Territories of Malaysia, these include the Islamic Family Law  
Act, No. 303 of 1984 (Federal Territories) for the more substantive rules on Is-
lamic law; the Syariah Court Civil Procedure Act, No. 585 of 1999 (Federal 
Territories); and the Syariah Criminal Offences Act, No. 557 of 1997 (Federal 
Territories) for laying down the procedural rules for the Syariah courts. In Bru-
nei, examples are the Islamic Family Law Emergency Order of 1999 and the 
Syariah Courts Civil Procedure Order of 2005. 
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appointed under Memorandum Order No. 370 (13 August 1973) with 
following instructions: 
1. To survey, collect and gather materials on Muslim laws from 
all available sources with particular emphasis on current Phil-
ippine laws affected by Islamic laws; 
2. To collect and reconcile Philippine laws with Muslim laws 
[…] 
3. To prepare a preliminary draft of the proposed Code of Phil-
ippine Muslim laws (Shari’ah, Fiqh, Adat etc.) and its imple-
menting agencies.17 
Less than a year later, on 4 April 1974, the report was submitted to the 
office of the president. The accompanying memorandum was at pains to 
reconcile the comprehensiveness of the envisioned administrative system 
and the extensiveness of the sighted material, on one hand, with the 
limitations of the substantive rules, on the other. 
It must be underscored that the draft Code does not seek to codify Mus-
lim or Islamic Substantive Law for this should be another product of 
the codification effort, a second stage, if we may.[…] The Re-
search Staff has examined the practical mechanics of administra-
tion of Muslim law in other jurisdictions like Malaysia (Malacca 
and Negri Simbilian), Singapore, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, Nige-
ria, Lebanon, Indonesia and many other countries. It was far from 
the intention of the Staff to introduce into our jurisdiction some-
thing that may be found irrelevant to our existing conditions and 
situations for we have developed in our own Muslim communities 
the rudiments of Islamic or Muslim law and customary adat law. 
(emphasis in original)18 
Indeed, this draft was much more closely aligned to the neighbouring 
codes of Singapore and Malaysia. Regarding its structure, the draft con-
sisted of nine chapters, which again covered preliminary matters before 
providing provisions for a council (Majlis), the Syariah courts and then 
the narrow scope of ‘substantive’ matters including property, marriage 
and divorce. As in Singapore, those ‘substantive’ matters were much 
more concerned with procedural issues and the ways in which disputes 
in those areas were to be adjudicated. The reason why the 1977 CMPL 
diverted from this well-trodden path will be further explored in the sec-
                                                 
17  Research Staff for the Codification of Muslim Personal Laws (1974: 210). 
18  Research Staff for the Codification of Muslim Personal Laws (1974: 20), as 
cited in Bentley (1981: 56). 
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tion below on the rationale and function of the codes. Arguably, one 
could surmise that the 1977 CMPL inverted the structure of the prevail-
ing formula in Southeast Asia, preferring to provide for limited ‘substan-
tive’ provisions at the beginning. 
The next section will further explore the substance of the codes, 
looking at the content and purpose together. 
3.2 Exploring the Content and Purpose of the Codes  
While the chosen structure of the codes already provided hints about the 
intent and purpose of the codes, this can be much better elucidated by 
looking at the content of those codes. As previously mentioned, the 
codes fulfil the dual purpose of establishing the scope of Islamic law and 
the bureaucratic and judicial institutions required to administer it. 
3.2.1 The Scope of Law for Muslims 
All four codes set out the scope of the legislation in their early provision, 
acknowledging that their function is to “consolidate the law […] the 
constitution and organisation of religious authorities”;19 “a law concern-
ing the enforcement and administration of Islamic Law, the constitution 
and organisation of the Syariah Courts, and related matters”; 20  and 
“regulating Muslim religious affairs and to constitute a council to advise 
on matters relating to the Muslim religion in Singapore and a Syariah 
Court”.21 Article 2(c) of the 1977 CMPL (Philippines) also states that the 
code “provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Mus-
lim personal laws among Muslims” but goes further by stating that it also 
intends to “codif[y] Muslim personal laws”, article 2(b) 1977 CMPL 
(Philippines). This is not stated in the codes of Singapore, Malaysia and 
Brunei. The preface of AMLA (Singapore) has a much vaguer expression 
of this, noting that it makes “provision for regulating Muslim religious 
affairs”; it is even broader in Brunei were the codes provides for “regula-
tion of religious affairs”.22 
The Philippines’ code sets out a value system that can be preserved 
in the Philippines context and focuses on defining these values. This was 
clearly specified in the report, which acknowledged that while the Islamic 
legal system is a “complete system”, only parts that were “fundamentally 
                                                 
19  Preface, Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei). 
20  Preface, Administration of Islamic Law Act (Federal Territories).  
21  Preface AMLA (Singapore). 
22  Preface Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei). 
  38 Kerstin Steiner 
 
personal were to be codified” and overly complicated matters only had 
“fundamental principles […] stated”, with details left to judges. The 
caveat was that any of those principles that were contrary to the Consti-
tution of the Philippines were not to be incorporated (the report as cited 
in Bentley 1981: 61). 
The next question is where the limited substantive rules for Islamic 
law are to be sourced from. The codes obviously refer to the classical 
sources, which are the Quar’an and hadith. Regarding the accepted mad-
dhab (schools of Islamic thought), different approaches have been cho-
sen. In the Philippines, all four Sunni maddhab are accepted; article 6(2) 
of the 1977 CMPL (Philippines).  
Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei favour the Shafi’i maddhab, to vary-
ing extents. In Singapore, the requirement to “ordinarily follow the ten-
ets of the Shafi’i school of law” unless they are opposed to public inter-
est or are explicitly asked to follow a particular maddhab is only explicitly 
made for the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (Islamic Religious Council 
of Singapore or MUIS) and its legal committee, section 33 AMLA (Sin-
gapore). Such an explicit reference is missing for the Syariah courts. The 
Singaporean Syariah courts have to apply “Muslim law, as varied where 
applicable by Malay custom” according to section 35(3) AMLA (Singa-
pore), providing them with more flexibility regarding the applicable law. 
In Malaysia, section 39(1) of the Administration of Islamic Law Act 
(Federal Territories) refers to the Shafi’i school of legal thought as the 
main maddhab to be used when giving a fatwa, although subsection 2 
allows the Mufti to use any of the other Sunni maddhab where “public 
interest” so requires. The Shafi’i maddhab is not exclusively mentioned as 
a source for the Syariah courts. Instead, hukum syarak (Islamic law) is 
defined as Islamic law according to any recognised maddhab; Section 2 of 
the Administration of Islamic Law Act (Federal Territories).  
The Shafi’i maddhab is also more slightly favoured in the legislative 
provisions, with article 2(1) of the Brunei Constitution stating that 
“‘Muslim Religion’ means the Muslim Religion according to the Shafeite 
sect of that religion”. This preference for the Shafi’i maddhab is also seen 
in section 43(1) of the Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei).  
Steiner (2015a: 611) analysed the usage of those classical sources in 
the Syariah courts of Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei and concluded that 
while the regulatory framework is similar, the “frequency of use, and the 
manner in which they are used, depends very much on the local circum-
stances.” In the case of Brunei, those sources were cited in order to 
provide additional legitimacy to state legislation. The classical sources 
and maddhab are instrumentalised and considered part and parcel of the 
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MIB ideology. Malaysian Syariah courts made most frequent use of the 
classical sources, sometimes at the expense of national laws. Indeed, 
historically the Syariah appeal boards have accused some Syariah courts 
of devaluating national laws (Steiner 2015a: 602). Nowadays, this claim is 
made by civil society groups and some of the civil courts (see Steiner 
2017 for an overview). 
Thus, it appears that all the four codes set a clear scope for what 
constitutes Islam and Islamic law. They also stipulate the sources of 
Islamic law, with a clear preference for the Sunni interpretation of Islam-
ic law. Regarding the four maddhab, there is a preference for the Shafi’i 
maddhab in most countries. It is interesting that the two countries with 
Muslim-minority populations provide the most flexibility regarding 
which maddhab is to be applied. The rationale for this could be to provide 
more scope to ensure that Islamic law is indeed compatible with the 
overall state framework. On the other hand, Brunei provides the least 
flexibility, probably because Islam is so deeply embedded in the MIB 
ideology. Thus, flexibility in the interpretation of Islamic law is not en-
couraged; it is supposed to align with the MIB ideology. 
3.2.2 The Non-Judicial Bureaucratic Institutions:  
The Islamic Religious Councils (Majlis), the Mufti and 
Ministries  
Three main non-judicial bureaucratic institutions are utilised to adminis-
ter Islam in Southeast Asia. These institutions are commonly referred to 
as the Islamic Religious Council or Majlis, the Mufti and a ministry of 
religion or Islam. However, not all countries have all these institutions. 
As previously mentioned, only Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei es-
tablished Islamic religious councils; the Philippines decided not to estab-
lish this particular bureaucratic institution. The previously mentioned 
1974 Codification Research Staff Report was rejected primarily because 
of the fear that it might establish a “state within a state” (Bentley 1981: 
58). The 1977 CMPL (Philippines) limited the administrative side to 
prevent the establishment of an extensive bureaucracy that might have 
functioned as a focus for an alternative power centre.  
This is also evident when the position of the mufti or jurisconsult is 
examined. Title III of Book Four, which deals with this position, con-
tains only five articles. The jurisconsult has “on the written request of 
any interested party […] the authority to render legal opinions, based on 
recognized authorities, regarding any question relating to Muslim Law”, 
article 166(1) of the 1977 CMPL (Philippines). Article 167 of the 1977 
CMPL (Philippines) sets the salary at 48,000 PHP per year, which nowa-
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days does not even cover half the minimum wage for an unskilled work-
er in Manila (Stephens 2011: 11). As such, it is unsurprising that this 
position is often vacant – a situation that is unheard of in any of the 
neighbouring countries.  
Interestingly, the position of the jurisconsult is administratively un-
der the supervision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, article 
164(a) of the 1977 CMPL (Philippines). This is unique in Southeast Asia, 
where the position of the mufti is usually not embedded within the civ-
il/non-religious bureaucracy. Indeed, this approach is common for the 
Philippines, where even the Syariah courts are under the supervision of 
the Supreme Court (see below). All of this supports the point, made 
above, that the bureaucratic institutions in the Philippines are extremely 
limited and where they exist, they are deeply embedded in the existing 
non-religious state bureaucracy. 
The situation in Singapore is very similar. There was also a fear of 
creating independent bureaucratic institutions for Islam. Then-Minister 
for Culture and Social Affairs, Mr Othman bin Wok (1966: 240–241), 
made it clear that the Singaporean government would not entertain the 
possibility of a fully elected body entirely free from any control or 
supervision. This, no doubt, would be an ideal to which all of us 
should strive. But those who are aware of the position in Singa-
pore and how religious issues can be used or abused to create divi-
sions, dissatisfaction and civil strife must agree that, to begin with, 
at any rate, there must be some control and supervision, not nec-
essarily by the Government but by the most stable elements in 
Muslim society. The Bill therefore provides for an equal number 
of elected and appointed members – and this is indeed in line with 
the compositions of the Councils of Muslim religion in the states 
of Malaysia. In the present stage of Muslim society in Singapore, 
also, it would appear that election from the Muslim registered so-
cieties in Singapore would, in fact, provide a representative body 
in Singapore and the power of the President to appoint members 
will enable the Majlis to be a body more fully representative of the 
Muslim community. 
The Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore (MUIS) was one of the new key 
features when AMLA was introduced in 1966. MUIS was established in 
1968 when AMLA came into force. It is a statutory body organisational 
embedded within the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth, which 
is headed by the Minister of Culture, Community and Youth. Neo (2009: 
234) observed that MUIS was indeed embedded in this ministry as if it 
was a bureaucratic arm of that ministry. In addition to this bureaucratic 
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entrenchment, there has been a cabinet position for a Minister-in-Charge 
of Muslim Affairs since 1977.  
The Council of MUIS is the overall decision-making body and its 
compilation and appointment illustrate the government’s need for assur-
ance and control over Islam. The rules and procedure of appointment to 
the MUIS council have changed very little since the inaugural Act came 
into force. Section 7 AMLA prescribes that the council consist of a Pres-
ident, a Chief Executive, the Mufti, not more than 7 members appointed 
by the President of Singapore recommended by the Minister-in-Charge 
of Muslim Affairs, and no fewer than seven members also appointed by 
the President of Singapore based on suggestions made by Muslim socie-
ties. Interestingly, MUIS itself decides on which Muslim societies are 
permitted to make suggestions for the membership. This is hardly a 
democratic process and indeed, directly or indirectly, the government of 
Singapore has control over the appointments to this council. This was a 
contentious issue when changes to AMLA (Singapore) were discussed in 
the early 2000s. The second reading of the Administration of Muslim 
(Amendment) Act, No 35 of 2005 was delayed in order to facilitate more 
engagement with Muslim community leaders (Hussain 2005). One of the 
suggestions was to create the position of a non-executive President who 
was to be appointed directly or indirectly by the Muslim community. 
However, this did not come to pass. Additionally, the maximum number 
of members appointed directly by the President of Singapore increased 
from five to seven, hardly an improvement of the democratic representa-
tion of the Muslim communities. Instead, this shows a continuance of 
the control exercised by the government over Muslim affairs, particularly 
when looking at the scope of MUIS responsibilities covering religious, 
educational, economic and cultural activities of Muslims, as well as spe-
cific administrative functions including administering, developing and 
managing mosques; administering Islamic religious schools and educa-
tion; issuing halal certification; administering and organising the haj; and 
issuing fatwa (Steiner 2015b: 8–9). 
The Office of the Mufti is also located within MUIS and acts as the 
secretariat of the Fatwa Committee. The role of the Fatwa Committee is 
to issue a fatwa (or ruling) on any point of the Muslim law upon the re-
quest of a Muslim, section 32 AMLA (Singapore).23 It is interesting to 
                                                 
23  For a detailed account of the fatwa process in the context of bureaucracy of 
Islam in Singapore, see the contribution of Afif Pasuni in this special issue. 
  42 Kerstin Steiner 
 
note how these fatawa24 are treated when they become an issue in the 
civil courts.  
There is a precedent of cases where the fatwa was set aside. Judge 
Thean, in Saniah bte Ali and others v Abdullah bin Ali [1990] 1 SLR(R) 555 
at 17, stated: 
In my opinion, the fatwa is merely an opinion of the Majlis and is not binding 
on this court which has full jurisdiction to decide on the matter in issue. […] 
For the reasons I have given and on the construction I have 
placed on ss 23 and 24 of the CPF Act and s 112(1) of the AML 
Act, I cannot, with respect, accept the fatawas correct. (emphasis 
added) 
In the case of Mohamed Ismail bin Ibrahim and Another v Mohammad Taha bin 
Ibrahim [2004] SGHC 210 at 64, the judge MPH Rubin was at pains to 
stress the respect for the Mufti and the Fatwa Committee: 
I must say in all earnestness that I have the highest regard for Tu-
an Syed Isa. His sincerity, zeal and dedication to the office he 
holds in the service of the Muslim community in Singapore are 
worthy of praise. Similarly, I also hold the members of the Fatwa 
Committee in high esteem.  
On the other hand, the judge did not refrain from criticising the proce-
dure of the Fatwa Committee, commenting that:  
There are many troubling questions concerning the manner in 
which the will of the testator came to be certified, validated and 
subsequently ratified. Although no negative motive can be at-
tributed to Tuan Syed Isa, his validation of the will on the day it 
was executed and his predisposition in favour of its construction 
should have effectively ruled him out from partaking in the delib-
eration of the Fatwa Committee that upheld its validity. It is an 
important principle of Western as well as Muslim jurisprudence 
that a person cannot be a judge in his own cause.25  
In the case of Shafeeg bin Salim Talib and another v Fatimah bte Abud bin 
Talib and others [2010] SGCA 11 at 28, the judge held that general law 
would prevail over Muslim law 
                                                 
24  For the purpose of this paper I will use the spelling fatawa to indicate the plural 
of fatwa. An often found alternative spelling is fatwas. 
25  Mohamed Ismail bin Ibrahim and Another v Mohammad Taha bin Ibrahim [2004] 
SGHC 210 at 55. 
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Absent such exceptions [where the legislation makes explicit ex-
ceptions for Muslims], legislation must prevail over personal law, such as 
Muslim law, as even common law prevails over personal law where the circum-
stances do not require the common law to be modified in favour of personal law. 
(emphasis added) 
Moreover, the judge stated that fatawa were to be treated like “expert 
opinion on civil law” and thus not necessarily binding on the court.26 
The non-judicial bureaucracy in Singapore is deeply entrenched in 
the state bureaucratic system, which exercises significant control over it. 
This control allows for certain cooperation within boundaries that are set 
by the state and carefully monitored by non-religious state institutions, as 
we have seen in the treatment of fatawa by the civil courts.  
In Brunei, the religious bureaucracy is similarly deep-rooted in the 
state bureaucratic system but for very different reasons and through a 
different mechanism. Article 3(3) of the Brunei’s Constitution of 1959 
arranges for the Religious Council to act as the Religious Adviser to the 
Sultan. The Sultan himself has the exclusive power to appoint members 
to the Religious Council for such a period as he deems fit (section 13 
Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei)), as well as make tem-
porary appointments or cancel appointments in case of absence without 
leave or becomes unfit (sections 15 and 16 Religious Council and Kadis 
Courts Act (Brunei)). This monopoly in terms of determining the mem-
bership is unsurprising given that Brunei is indeed an absolute monarchy, 
which means that decisions regarding any political, judicial and executive 
appointments are at the sole discretion of the Sultan. According to sec-
tion 38 Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei), the role of the 
Islamic Religious Council is to: 
on behalf of and under the authority of His Majesty as Head of the Re-
ligion of Brunei Darussalam, aid and advise His Majesty on all mat-
ters relating to the religion of Brunei Darussalam, and shall in all such 
matters be the chief authority in Brunei Darussalam, save in so far as 
may be otherwise provided by this Act. (emphasis added) 
The section is interesting as, on one hand, it postulates the subordinate 
role of the Islamic Religious Council, while on the other declares it the 
chief authority in all matters of religion. Indeed, the responsibility of the 
Islamic Religious Council in Brunei is as far-reaching as in Singapore; it 
is responsible for certain Islamic financial matters and the sole trustee for 
                                                 
26  Shafeeg bin Salim Talib and another v Fatimah bte Abud bin Talib and others [2010] 
SGCA 11 at 63. 
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mosques in Brunei. Moreover, the Islamic Religious Council approves 
any enactment or modification of Islamic law developed by the Islamic 
Legal Unit in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It also has the authority 
to initiate policies for Islamic law. Despite this far-reaching authority, it 
should not be forgotten that the Sultan has the power to veto any initia-
tive. 
The office of the mufti was established in 1962 and, according to 
section 40 Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei), the Sultan 
has the exclusive right to appoint or revoke the appointment of the mufti. 
To date there have been only two office-bearers, and the changes that 
this office has seen have concerned its location within the state bureau-
cratic system. It was originally under the authority of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and, with the appointment of the second mufti in 1994, 
it was relocated as one of five offices under the authority of the Prime 
Minister – that is, the Sultan himself. Lindsey and Steiner (2012a: 391) 
observed that this was a reflection of the Sultan’s “increased involvement 
in the administration of Islam in his kingdom in recent decades”. 
This point has also been observed by other scholars. As Müller 
(2015: 320) aptly stated:  
in the absence of democratic institutions or an influential civil so-
ciety, the Islamic bureaucracy [comprising the Islamic Religious 
Council and the Ministry of Religion as well as the State Mufti 
Department] has become the sultanate’s most powerful political 
actor outside of the royal family. 
A link between state, politics and religion can be observed in Malaysia. 
Islamic law is a state matter under the Ninth Schedule, List II of the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia.27 As such, there are bureaucratic insti-
tutions at the state level but also some at federal level where coordina-
tion is agreed upon by the states or the ruler.28 This means that the au-
                                                 
27  A result of the federal structure is that there are Islamic institutions at state and 
federal level. The ones at federal level include the Conference of Rulers, whose 
religious powers are mostly bureaucratic or ceremonial, and a National Council 
for Religious Affairs. The latter is a potential competitor for power. However, 
Section 8 of the National Council for Religious Affairs Ordinance 1987 pro-
vides that the State Councils are bound by the advice of the National Council 
only if it has the support of the Council of Rulers. This is an attempt to mini-
mise potential conflicts. 
28  While this article has focused on the institutions at state level, there are of 
course numerous bureaucratic institutions at the federal level. These include the 
Council of Rulers, JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia), the Department 
for Islamic Development, the National Council for Religious Affairs, the Na-
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thority, power and legitimacy of those federal institutions are based on 
agreement by the states. For the purposes of this article, the focus is on 
those state bureaucratic institutions as they can be more easily compared 
to the other institutions in the region.  
The constitutional monarch – sometimes also called ruler or sultan 
of those states – of the state acts as the Head of the Religion of Islam. 
This is the case in nine of the 13 Malaysian states; the four remaining 
states (Penang, Melacca, Sarawak and Sabah) are headed by a governor 
instead of a ruler. In those states, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the elected 
monarch who is head of the state, also acts as the Head of Islam. 
The Islamic Religious Councils (Majlis Ugama Islam commonly re-
ferred to as Majlis) in Malaysia are established by those Heads of Religion 
of Islam. The membership of the Islamic Religious Council consists of a 
chair and his deputy; the chief secretary to the government or repre-
sentative; the Attorney General or representative; the Mufti; the Commis-
sioner of the City of Kuala Lumpur; and 15 members, five of whom are 
learned in Islamic studies, section 10(1) Administration of Islamic Law 
Act (Federal Territories).29 The chair, deputy and members learned in 
Islamic law are appointed by the Sultan (in some states on the advice of 
the Chief Minister)30 for a maximum of three years. 
The prerogative to appoint the members to the Majlis is carefully 
guarded by the sultans. For instance, in Perak in 2008, the Chief Minister 
decided to replace the Director of the Islamic Religious Department 
without consulting the Sultan first. While the Islamic Religious Depart-
ment is a separate bureaucratic institution, the director also functions as 
the secretary to the council. In the end the Chief Minister retracted the 
decision and apologised (Shuaib 2008). 
                                                                                                    
tional Fatwa Committee. For details of their functions, see Lindsey and Steiner 
(2012a). 
29  As stated above, the different states have individual enactments regarding the 
administration of Islamic law, although the differences are minimal. To com-
pare, the composition of the Islamic religious council in Selangor consists of a 
Chair and a deputy; five members who hold the offices of Secretary of the State, 
Legal Adviser of the State, State Financial Officer, the Mufti and the Head of 
State Police; and not more than eight members learned in Islamic law (Section 
11 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, No. 3 of 1952 (Selangor). 
30  See Section 10(2) of the Administration of Islamic Law Act, No. 505 of 1993 
(Federal Territories); Section 11(2) of the Administration of the Religion of Is-
lam Enactment, No. 1 of 2003 (Selangor). In Johor, the Sultan appoints with-
out the advice of the Chief Minister, Section 11(2) of the Administration of the 
Religion of Islam Enactment, No. 16 of 2003 (Johor). 
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The Majlis are responsible for advising on all matters relating to the 
religion of Islam, section 4(1) Administration of Islamic Law Act (Feder-
al Territories), except in matters of Islamic law, as those fall within the 
purview of the Syariah courts. Everyday administrative and religious 
matters are handled by a separate Department for Religious or Islamic 
Affairs, Jabatan Agama Islam. Therefore, these Jabatan Agama Islam are 
more or less implementing the policies as set by the Majlis and the Head 
of Religion in each state.  
The last piece in this intertwined web of state bureaucratic institu-
tions is the mufti. The consequences of the federal system and the fact 
that each state has its own rules is best seen in the appointment process 
for the mufti. The mufti is appointed by the Head of Religion of Islam in 
each state, except for Sabah31 and Sarawak.32 The ruler has either sole 
discretion33 or acts on the advice of the Council34 or the state execu-
tive.35 As in neighbouring Singapore and Brunei, the mufti presides over 
the state’s Fatwa Committee and is the head of the department or office 
of the mufti. The role of the department or office of the mufti is to pro-
                                                 
31  In Sabah, the Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governor) appoints the Mufti on the 
advice of the Minister Minister in Charge of Islamic A, Section 33 of the Ad-
ministration of Islamic Law Enactment, No 1 of 1999 (Sabah). 
32  In Sarawak, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has the power to appoint the Mufti, on 
the recommendation of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governor), Section 35 of 
the Islamic Council Ordinance, No 41 of 2001 (Sarawak). 
33  Section 6 of the Administration of the Syariah Court Enactment, No 3 of 1982 
(Kelantan); Section 34 of the Administration of Islamic Law Enactment, No 3 
of 1991 (Pahang); Section 33 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam 
Enactment, No 4 of 2004 (Perak); Section 9 of the Administration of Muslim 
Law Enactment, No 3 of 1964 (Perlis); Section 44 of the Administration of the 
Religion of Islam Enactment, No 1 of 2003 (Selangor); and Section 46 of the 
Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs Enactment, No 2 of 2001 (Tereng-
ganu). 
34  Section 44 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment, No 16 of 
2003 (Johor); Section 5 of the Enactment on Mufti and Fatwa, No 10 of 2008 
(Kedah); and Section 45 of the Administration of Islam Enactment, No. 10 of 
2003 (Negeri Sembilan). 
35  Section 32 of the Administration of Islamic Law Enactment (Federal Territo-
ries) states that the Ruler can appoint the Mufti on the advice of the Minister 
and after consultation with the Council. 
 Section 32 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment, No 7 of 
2002 (Malacca) states that the Mufti is appointed on the advice of the State au-
thority and after consultation with the Council.  
 Section 44 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment, No 2 of 
2004 (Penang) gives the Ruler the authority to appoint the Mufti on the advice 
of the State Executive Council. 
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duce fatawa – like in Singapore – but also to produce religious books and 
pamphlets and organise religious programmes (Shuaib, Bustami, and 
Kamal 2010: 18). 
Malaysia has the most extensive bureaucratic structure, due not only 
to the geographic size of the area or the number of Muslims living in the 
country. An increasing number of interacting and overlapping bureau-
cratic institutions have been established at state and federal level since 
independence. These have been set up as a result in response to calls for 
more Islamisation, whether because of a genuine wish to embrace Islam 
or, as Peters (2002: 91) refers to it in a different context, to “take the 
wind out of the sails of the Islamist opposition”. The motivation is diffi-
cult to unearth, but what is clear that these bureaucratic institutions “ex-
ercise authority in relation to Muslim religious life that is increasing 
broad and deep” (Lindsey and Steiner 2012a: 109). 
Providing this broad and deep control over Islam through those bu-
reaucratic institutions is not unique to Malaysia – only the competition 
and overlap between them is; instead, it is a phenomenon we also find in 
neighbouring Singapore and Brunei. The difference is how deeply the 
bureaucratic institutions are embedded and streamlined within the state. 
In Singapore and Brunei, they are much closer entrenched into the polit-
ical system. This is no surprise as Islam is one of the cornerstones of the 
political ideology MIB in Brunei. In the case of Singapore, Islam’s poten-
tial to be a source of opposition necessitates, at least in the view of the 
government to strategies of co-option, management and restriction. For 
all of those, a strong link between the bureaucratic institution and poli-
tics is essential. 
The next section looks at the ‘final’ bureaucratic institution; that is, 
the judicial institutions, which provide the final element of how Islam is 
accommodated. These Syariah courts are the final arbitrator of what 
exactly constitutes Islamic law. 
3.3 The Judicial Bureaucratic Institutions:  
The Syariah Courts 
All four countries have a plural legal system with a civil and religious 
legal system. Consequently, they also have a plural court system in com-
mon, where one adjudicates on civil matters and another on the religious 
matter. The following section looks at (1) the structure of those courts, 
(2) their jurisdictions, and (3) the normative hierarchy of civil and reli-
gious law in cases where matters can be adjudicated in either of those 
legal systems. 
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The structures of the Syariah courts are essentially quite similar and 
basic. There is at least a two-tier, if not a three-tier system, where deci-
sions are made by a lower court, usually called something along the lines 
of Syariah court and can then be appealed to the next level. There are 
only a few noteworthy observations based on the specific country con-
text. In Singapore, the Syariah Court and Syariah Appeal Board draw 
their authority from AMLA (Singapore) and are therefore outside the 
civil court structure. Moreover there is a revealing procedure as to how 
those members of the appeal panel are chosen. The President of Singa-
pore, on the advice of the MUIS, nominates a panel of seven Muslims 
for three years. From this panel, the President of MUIS then selects 
three of those panel members to be on the board when an Appeal Board 
has to convene (section 55(3) AMLA (Singapore)). There is thus no 
separation between a non-judicial and judicial institution. 
In Singapore, the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts in personal mat-
ters is confined to disputes where both parties are Muslims and married 
under Muslim law; section 35(2) AMLA (Singapore). In 2008, the juris-
diction of the Syariah courts was increased to cover certain personal 
matters such as marriage expenses and the registration of divorces; sec-
tion 52(3)(a) AMLA (Singapore). Significantly, the AMLA (Amendment) 
Act (No. 20) of 1999 conferred concurrent jurisdiction on the secular 
courts and the Syariah Court in certain matters reflecting the new Section 
17A of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, No 24 of 1969. This provi-
sion bestowed concurrent jurisdiction on the High Court and the Syariah 
Court in civil proceedings involving matters of maintenance, custody of 
children, and disposition or division of property on divorce. In order to 
avoid a multiplicity of actions, proceedings should remain in the High 
Court in certain circumstances, such as by consent of the parties or with 
leave of the Syariah Court, and the High Court will then apply civil law 
to determine the questions of custody and access to children and the 
division of matrimonial assets; section 17A(3) of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act. Those changes have been criticised by the Muslim minor-
ity, who considered this a way “to opt out of their religion if convenient”; 
a permission to go “forum shopping”; an “extension of the civil law […] 
to Muslims”; or, even worse, a return to colonial times where “non-
Muslims were adjudicating on Islamic legal matters” (Steiner 2015b: 12). 
As in the legal standing of fatawa in civil courts, it was ultimately the state 
that had the final say in this decision. 
Following independence, the Malaysian states had various different 
structures for the Syariah courts. The predominant ones were either a 
two- or three-tier structure; that is, with at least one lower-level Syariah 
  Islam, Law and Bureaucracies in Southeast Asia 49
 

 
court and one higher-level Syariah court, which was either called the 
Syariah High Court or the Syariah Court of Appeal. In 1998, the national 
Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia (Department of Syariah Judiciary 
Malaysia or JKSM) was established. One of its achievements was the 
establishment of a Syariah Appeal Court at the federal level. This meant 
that, following the decision of a Syariah High Court at the individual 
state level, appeals were to be heard at the federal level. This streamlining 
and harmonisation of Islamic law has continued since. In 2017, JAKIM 
established a special committee at national level, the Syariah Courts Em-
powerment Committee (JKMMS), one of whose tasks is to look at the 
structure of the Syariah courts (The Star Online 2017).  
Federal matters also play an important role in determining the juris-
diction of the Syariah courts. As in neighbouring Singapore, the jurisdic-
tional divide between the civil and Syariah courts is equally contested in 
Malaysia, although this time not between the state and the Muslim com-
munity but between the different courts, society and politics. The situa-
tion became increasingly complex with the constitutional amendments in 
1988. Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution (Malaysia) was amend-
ed to state that  
[t]he courts referred to in clause (1) [that is, the Civil High Court 
of Malaya and Borneo and the inferior courts] shall have no juris-
diction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Sya-
riah Court.  
The rationale behind this amendment was to prevent decisions from the 
Syariah courts to be appealed to the civil courts. Nonetheless, this has 
caused significant problems for the Syariah courts and the civil courts 
regarding who has jurisdiction of interfaith disputes involving the stand-
ing of non-Muslims in the Syariah courts, constitutional rights, as well as 
review of administrative decisions.36 Faruqi (2007) stated that “with the 
slightest whiff of Islamic jurisprudence, our superior court abdicates in 
favour of the Syariah courts even though momentous issues of constitu-
tionality may be at stake or even if one of the parties is a non-Muslim.” 
Indeed, this seems to have been a problem, particularly in the case of 
unilateral conversations of minor children to Islam by one parent. In 
Subashini’s case – where a wife commenced proceedings in the civil 
courts against her husband who had converted to Islam and subsequent-
ly converted the children as well – Judge Suriyadi JCA commented on 
                                                 
36  Numerous different approaches have been used in order to solve this problem, 
including looking at the parties involved in the dispute, the remedies sought, or 
the subject matter of the dispute; see Steiner (2013) for a summary. 
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Subashini’s strategy as “want[ing] her day in court” and moreover cen-
sured her for:  
wanting the civil court to deal with her problems, the appellant 
[Subashini] had attempted to convince us that a civil court has the 
jurisdiction and knowledge to deal with her matter even though 
imbued and intertwined with thick strands of Islamic elements. In 
short, the appellant wanted the civil court to arrogate the function 
and duties of the Syariah Court, regardless of the litigant’s right of 
choice, let alone he had already made his decision. (emphasis in the orig-
inal)37 
This decision has been criticised for ignoring existing jurisprudence, such 
as Latifah binte Mat Zin v Rosmawati binte Sharibun & Anor38 where the 
point was made that “if one of the parties is a non-Muslim, the syariah court does 
not have jurisdiction over the case, even if the subject matters falls within its jurisdic-
tion” [emphasis in the original]. This was an issue most recently in the 
case of Indira Gandhi, where the Federal Court39 in early 2018 upheld 
the decision of the High Court40 that had raised exactly this point. One 
would hope that this latest decision by the highest court in Malaysia now 
means that this matter is laid to rest. I would personally echo the post-
script made by Judicial Commissioner Lee Swee Seng in the previous 
High Court decision:  
[t]his decision is not a victory for anyone but a page in the continuing 
struggle of all citizens to find that dynamic equilibrium in a country of such 
diverse ethnicities; pursuing peace in less than a homogeneous society, 
giving space to one another where religious sensitivities are con-
cerned, tolerance and respect to our neighbours in pursuit of the 
Truth and Reality. (emphasis added)41 
While the decision of the Federal Court cannot be overruled, it remains 
to be seen whether the principles laid down in it will stand the test of 
time and the political and social pressure to amend it. 
The problem of concurrent jurisdiction is not only a problem in 
personal law disputes but also affects the implementation of Islamic 
criminal law. Indeed, it is one of the main obstacles to the implementa-
                                                 
37  Subashini Rajasingham v Saravanan Thangathoray & Ors [2007] 2 MLJ 705 at 738–9. 
38  Latifah bt Mat Zin v Rosmawati bt Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101. 
39  Currently unpublished decision by the Federal Court, Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v 
Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam, Civil Appeal No 01(f)-17-06/2016(A) on file with 
author. 
40  Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam [2013] 5 MLJ 552.  
41  Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam [2013] 5 MLJ 552. 
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tion of hudud, Islamic criminal law in the Malaysian states. A solution to 
the problem there is even less likely than to one in personal matters. 
Brunei now has a similar three-tier system to the Malaysian one, 
with the Syariah Subordinate Court, the Syariah High Court and a  
Syariah Appeal Court.  
The jurisdiction of the Syariah courts in Brunei has equally under-
gone significant statutory changes. It was regulated in Religious Council 
and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei), only to be replaced by the short-lived 
Syariah Courts Emergency Order of 1998, which was superseded by 
Syariah Courts Act, cap 184, of 2000. The Act effectively abolished the 
numerous provisions regarding the judiciary, while other provisions of 
Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act (Brunei) remain in force unless 
specifically repealed by another written law. Of importance is section 5 
of the Syariah Courts Act of 2000, which invests the Syariah courts with 
exclusive jurisdiction; that is, where there is a jurisdictional conflict, the 
Syariah court will now overrule other courts. Moreover, the Syariah 
courts have recently seen an increase in jurisdiction in criminal matters 
where certain criminal offences under the Syariah Penal Code 2013 are 
also applicable to non-Muslims. This means that Syariah courts now 
explicitly have jurisdiction over non-Muslims in certain matters (see 
Lindsey and Steiner 2016). 
Unlike in neighbouring Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, in the Phil-
ippines there was no acknowledged need to establish religious courts, as 
colonial policies aimed to establish one single body of law (Bentley 1981: 
47). The reluctance to set up those courts remains evident today. While 
the 1977 CMPL allows for the establishment of the Syariah courts, those 
courts have only been created and active since the late 2000s (Stephens 
2011: 11). While the Syariah courts in the discussed region stand outside 
the civil judiciary, in the case of the Philippines, the Syariah courts are 
subject to the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court; article 
137 of the 1977 CMPL. Therefore, there is no clear distinction between 
the court systems, as seen in Singapore, Malaysia or Brunei.  
Moreover, the courts are not well accepted by the populace. In 2010, 
for example, 22 out of 36 courts received no new cases and eight had no 
new cases at all from 2006 to 2011 (Stephens 2011: 13). They have been 
neglected by the state in terms of funding, resources, training and pres-
tige and generally suffer from serious “operational woes” (Guerrero 2007: 
5). Thus, the perceived neglect of the Moros continues, now through the 
neglect of the Syariah courts.  
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4 Concluding Remarks: Rationale and 
Function of the Codes 
The similarities between the codes of Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei are 
not surprising given their common history and the frequent legal bor-
rowing from one country to another. All these codes served a specific 
purpose, which is to provide a legislative framework for Islam. As such, 
they are what Michaels (2006: 351) termed a form of “social engineering” 
whereby a conscientiously held purpose had to be fulfilled. Islam needed 
to be accommodated: a framework for the administration of Islam need-
ed to be established and certain guidelines had to be established as to 
what constitutes Islamic law; that is, the limited scope of ‘substantive 
laws’. 
However, the selected case studies in this article have shown differ-
ent methods of how Islam is ‘guided’ by the different states in Southeast 
Asia. The codes in Southeast Asia are generally less of a statement of 
substantive Islamic law and are rather concerned with setting up a state-
sanctioned bureaucracy for the administration of law for Muslims. The 
methods range from appropriation and accommodation to control and 
subjugation in the different political and legal frameworks of Singapore, 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. 
At one end of the spectrum are the secular systems with a Muslim 
minority: Singapore and the Philippines. Both of those countries have to 
carefully manage the relationship between state and Islam, majority and 
minority rights.  
AMLA (Singapore) is not concerned with codifying the substance 
of Islamic law but rather with providing a framework for its administra-
tion. As in colonial times, the PAP government preferred to, first, keep 
Islamic law largely restricted to private law, and secondly, maintain the 
largely compliant and co-opted character of Muslim religious institutions. 
It did so by systematically establishing a web of interlocking state institu-
tions – that is, MUIS including the Legal Fatwa Committee and the  
Syariah court system – with decisive interpretative authority regarding 
law for Muslims in Singapore and a monopoly on its enforcement 
(Steiner 2015b). Yet the Singaporean model is not only about control, as 
it oscillates between co-option, management and restriction.  
The approach taken by the Philippines veers in a similar direction of 
co-option, management and restriction, but there are significant differ-
ences. Singapore’s approach appears more subtle, providing for a reli-
gious bureaucracy that is still deeply embedded in the civil bureaucracy. 
Certain institutions of the bureaucracy are linked to the Muslim commu-
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nity, albeit to a limited extent. This is not the case in the Philippines. The 
limited existing religious bureaucracy is part and parcel of the civil bu-
reaucracy subject to its supervision. There is no pretence of the involve-
ment of or accountability to the Muslim minority community. A ‘state 
within a state’ was feared back then and is still feared. It thus needs to be 
prevented.  
While the Philippines has chosen a minimalist approach to bureau-
cracies, Malaysia is at the other end of the spectrum with a multitude of 
bureaucratic institutions at state and federal level. These numerous insti-
tutions came about because of the close link between politics and Islam. 
One could argue that the fact that Islam fell in the prerogative of the 
individual sultans resulted in every state taking its own approach towards 
the administration of Islam. However, the states share certain character-
istics and harmonisation initiatives are adding to a streamlining of the 
administration of Islamic law in Malaysia. The fact that Malaysia is in-
deed a Muslim-majority country, and the resulting influence that Islam 
plays in politics and society at large, prevents Islam from being subordi-
nated to the state. Instead, it is a key concern of the state and political 
parties, one that cannot be controlled but has to be seen as positively 
accommodated.  
This notion of accommodation is taken one step further in Brunei, 
where Islam is not so much accommodated as appropriated by the state. 
As the name MIB suggests, Islam is part of the national ideology. Befit-
ting an absolute monarchy, the generally streamlined bureaucracy in 
Brunei further supports this development. 
We thus have a common codification process shared by Brunei, 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines upon independence. The codes 
have common elements at first glance yet the result, the approach to 
how Islam is to ‘guided’ is depending on the individual country context. 
There are indeed different forms of state bureaucracies required for the 
administration of Islam, despite the fact that the institutions and the 
scope of Islamic law are more or less similar. 
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